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1 
 
INTRODUCTION      I 
 
  
 Presidents have been issuing signing statements—in which they comment 
upon aspects of legislation they have signed into law—since the Monroe 
administration.  Until recently, the practice went largely unnoticed.  That changed 
with President George W. Bush, who thus far has issued signing statements 
relating to more than 1,000 statutory provisions, more than all prior presidents 
combined.
1
  He has done so as part of a broad strategy designed to expand his 
authority generally, and specifically to preserve his ability to challenge Congress 
on controversial issues such as interrogation techniques.  The sheer volume, as 
well as the context and tone, of this administration’s use of signing statements has 
brought this practice into the public spotlight, and generated a great deal of 
criticism.  The criticism has been largely legal in nature. That is, it has been 
rooted primarily in legal/constitutional arguments that signing statements in 
which a president declares an interpretation of legislation contrary to that of 
Congress, or his view that aspects of legislation are unconstitutional and therefore 
should not be enforced, violate the constitutional provisions establishing the 
separation of powers between the judicial and executive branches.  This paper 
briefly addresses these legal arguments, and concludes that, when measured 
                                                 
1
 T.J. Halstead, Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and Institutional 
Implications (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007) 9-12. 16 
Dec. 2007 <http://www.coherentbabble.com /signingstatements/CRS/RL33667-
9172007.pdf>. 
 
 
 
2 
against established legal principles, it is evident that signing statements do not 
violate the Constitution. 
The principal focus of this paper is on a second, non-legal analytical 
dimension: the efficacy of signing statements as policy.  It analyzes signing 
statements, as one commentator has put it, as a method for political—as opposed 
to legal—constitutional construction.
2
  It concludes that the use of signing 
statements by the current administration to advance its construction of the 
president’s constitutional authority has not been a successful policy.  This is 
because the administration’s policy has lacked the characteristics necessary for its 
constitutional construction to succeed in the long term, while at the same time it 
has produced serious and disruptive political issues that have hampered the 
administration in advancing its agenda.  
A two-dimensional assessment of signing statements—both as policy and 
in terms of their constitutionality—provides a superior analytical tool. The 
widespread criticism of signing statements is not satisfactorily answered or 
explained by the traditional legal analysis—like trying to fit a round peg into a 
square hole.   However, viewing them as a political policy strategy provides a 
broader and more complete perspective. 
This two-dimensional approach can be illustrated as follows: 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and 
Constitutional Meaning (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999). 
 
 
3 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY-POLICY MODEL 
 
 
 
 
Constitutional Unconstitutional 
Good 
Policy 1 2 
Bad 
Policy 3 4 
 
Conventional wisdom has confined policy analysis to squares one and four of the 
diagram.  This has created a false dichotomy that associates good policy with 
constitutionality and bad policy with unconstitutionality.  Some examples of 
issues that have been subject to this dichotomy are racial profiling, affirmative 
action, strip searches and drug testing.  At some point in time, each of these 
policies have been challenged as violations of the Constitution.  In the 2003 
Supreme Court case Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court found that the University of 
Michigan’s admission system gave too much weight to race and ethnicity.
3
  While 
affirmative action as a policy is a feasible and effective way of increasing 
diversity – a well intentioned policy – it was heavily scrutinized as a violation of 
the equal protection clause in the 14
th
 Amendment.  Policy analysis is not a “black 
and white” issue as legal arguments for many of these issues would suggest.  The 
unduly narrow view used in traditional analysis underutilizes available analytical 
tools and unnecessarily limits the resulting conclusions.  Making cells two and 
three available remedies this limitation, and enables greater analytical clarity. 
                                                 
3
 Gratz v. Bollinger, no. 02-516, Supreme Ct of the US, 23 June 2003. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
POLICY 
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 Utilization of the entire diagram allows for a more complete perspective of 
policies.  While policy and constitutionality are related, they are analytically 
distinct.  A policy is judged based upon its effectiveness, feasibility and a cost-
benefit analysis.  The constitutionality of a policy is based upon application of 
constitutional principles as prescribed by case law.  A policy can offer benefits 
that outweigh the costs to implement, be effective in addressing its goals, be 
totally feasible and yet never be employed because it is deemed unconstitutional.  
Examining constitutionality and policy separately creates the opportunity to 
modify a beneficial but unconstitutional policy so that it can be implemented 
without being termed illegal.  In turn, using the policy-constitutionality diagram 
can help prevent the implementation of a constitutional, but bad policy. 
The false choice that the conventional dichotomy creates is the idea that 
the effectiveness of a policy must correlate with constitutional legality.  As seen 
with signing statements, this dilutes the underlying issues and restricts the 
assessment of policies.  Application of this two-dimensional construct to signing 
statements provides a concrete illustration that a policy can fall within the 
parameters of the Constitution and still be a bad policy. By framing signing 
statements as policy, it becomes clear that the underlying issue is how they work 
as policy.  And many of the legal arguments being made for or against signing 
statements are, in fact, founded on the policy debates. 
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PART I 
 
The Constitutionality of Signing Statements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
SETTING THE STAGE: 
Signing statements against the backdrop       
of separation of powers 
 
II 
The argument that presidential signing statements are unconstitutional is 
predicated upon the proposition that the Constitution allocates the legislative 
function entirely to Congress, and that by stating his interpretation or intention not 
to enforce certain aspects of legislation, a president violates that allocation and 
improperly usurps a portion of the legislative function to the executive. In order to 
properly assess this proposition, it necessary to understand the background, 
purpose and effect of both signing statements and the separation of powers 
principles against which they are to be judged. 
 
- Evolution of Signing Statements as a Political Tool - 
 
A. Origins and different uses of signing statements. 
The United States Constitution assigns to Congress the authority of 
passing legislation.  The president, as head of the executive branch, is charged 
with enforcing legislation once passed.  For legislation passed by Congress to 
become effective, the president must sign it. Since at least 1830, presidents have 
on occasion accompanied their execution of legislation with statements 
commenting on or calling into question the validity of one or more provisions of 
the legislation, and/or their intent to enforce such provisions.  The first 
documented presidential signing statement dates back to the Monroe 
administration, and since that time approximately 2,200 signing statements have 
 
 
7 
been issued, the vast majority of them since the Reagan administration.
4
  For most 
of our history, this practice did not raise concerns about whether it violated the 
Constitution or the principle of separation of powers upon which it was based.  
However, use of these presidential signing statements increased substantially 
during the Reagan administration, and continued to be used liberally by Presidents 
George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton.  President George W. Bush has elevated the 
use of the signing statements to a completely new level, challenging over 1,000 
statutes in 118 laws during his first seven years, far more than any of his 
predecessors.
5
   
Not all signing statements are controversial; it depends on the context and 
intent of their use.  The types of signing statements that have fallen under scrutiny 
are those that challenge the constitutionality of signed bills and arguably 
circumvent the presentment clause of the Constitution.  Signing statements have 
been organized into three different categories by political scientist Christopher 
Kelley and former Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger: constitutional 
signing statements, political signing statements and rhetorical signing statements.  
Each type of signing statement has a different effect on the bill to which it is 
attached.  While these three types of signing statements have different policy 
                                                 
4
 Christopher S. Kelley “The Unitary Executive and the Presidential Signing 
Statement” Diss. Miami Univ., 2003. 4 Nov. 2007 <http://www.ohiolink.edu/ 
etd/s end-pdf.cgi/Kelley%20Christopher%20S .pdf?miami1057716977>. 
 
5
 T.J. Halstead, Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and Institutional 
Implications (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007) 9-12. 16 
Dec. 2007 <http://www.coherentbabble.com /signingstatements/CRS/RL33667-
9172007.pdf>. 
 
 
8 
effects, none of them have an immediate impact on the legislation to which they 
are attached. 
Rhetorical signing statements are used to convey the likely effects of a 
bill’s adoption on the public and certain constituencies.
6
  The president plays an 
important role in the legislative process, and much of a president’s success 
depends upon his ability to get legislation passed consistent with his political 
agenda.  Thus, it is often important that the president portray himself positively 
with respect to legislation that he signs.  Rhetorical signing statements have 
become a part of presidential strategy to relate to the public.  As a national 
figurehead, the president is often held responsible by the public for many of the 
nation’s problems.  Presidents have tried to mitigate this association by using 
political tools such as signing statements to positively affect public opinion.  This 
use of signing statements has no real negative consequences, and was the most 
common use of signing statements before the 1980s.   
Prior to the Reagan administration, signing statements were commonly 
used as a political device by the president.  Political signing statements are used to 
direct officers in the executive branch on how to interpret and administer a law 
signed by the president.
7
   This function relates to the fact that the executive 
branch has grown dramatically over time, making it increasingly difficult for a 
president to ensure that his constituents in the executive branch are all ‘on the 
                                                 
6
 Walter Dellinger, The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements 
(United States: Department of Justice, 3 Nov. 1993) 12 Oct. 2007 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/signing.htm>. 
 
7
 Ibid. 
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same page’ when it comes to executing legislation.  As James Pfiffner, an expert 
on the American presidency, has observed: 
 
In 1933, Franklin Roosevelt had only a few aides to 
help him draft and shepherd into law his famous 
‘100 days’ legislative agenda.  In 2007, there were 
more than 400 people in the White House Office, 
1,850 in the Executive Office of the President 
(which includes the White House Office), with a 
total of almost 5,000 serving the president and the 
White House more broadly.  In the 1930s, there 
were fewer than 150 presidential appointees to 
manage the executive branch.  In 2007, there were 
more than 600 (plus 3,000 more political 
appointees).  In the 1930s and 1940s, the aides to 
the president were most often generalists.  In the 
1990s, the presidency comprised a plethora of 
complex bureaucracies filled with specialist.
8
   
 
In this context, signing statements are useful tools for organizing a large and 
complex institution. 
Third, signing statements have been used by the president to assert his 
opinion that certain sections of a bill being signed are unconstitutional.
9
  Use of 
such ‘constitutional signing statements’ is a controversial practice because of the 
ambiguity of the language in Article II of the Constitution and due to differing 
                                                 
8
 James P. Pfiffner, The Modern Presidency 5th ed. (United States: Thomson 
Wadsworth, 2005) Viii. 
 
9
 Ibid. 
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interpretations of the separation of powers principle.  Article I, Section 7 – also 
known as the presentment clause – provides a structured framework within which 
a bill is supposed to become law, and the separate institutions’ role in that 
process.  Because signing statements are not part of this process (they are in fact 
not mentioned in the Constitution at all), it is debatable as to whether or not 
constitutional signing statements circumvent the presentment clause – impeding 
the legislative process – or if they are a modern tool used by the president to 
“faithfully execute” the laws.  Historically, this type of signing statement was the 
least used.  However, the use of constitutional signing statements has increased 
exponentially since the Reagan administration.  
This paper analyzes both the legal and policy implications of the 
constitutional type of presidential signing statements. It assesses the application of 
separation of powers principles from how they were envisioned by the 
Constitution’s framers, to how they have been applied and interpreted through 
history.  It then reviews some of the legal and practical barriers to resolving issues 
surrounding a particular signing statement, as well as the legislative provisions it 
challenges.  Finally, it reviews the policy implications of this practice and the 
political difficulties it creates. It concludes that signing statements likely do not 
violate the constitution, but more importantly, they create political problems that 
render them unsupportable as a matter of public policy. 
 
 
 
B. The signing statement controversy takes center stage: are they a legitimate 
exercise of executive power or an improper usurpation of legislative or judicial 
power?  
 
 
11 
 
The proliferation of constitutional signing statements during the George 
W. Bush administration has drawn attention to, and fanned the flames of 
controversy around this practice. At first, the issue was limited primarily to legal 
and political circles. Beginning with the Reagan administration in the 1980s, the 
Department of Justice issued a series of memoranda defending the limited use of 
signing statements as an appropriate use of executive power.
10
 The practice 
continued along a similar path through the Clinton and first Bush administrations.  
The use of signing statements changed in magnitude and philosophy with 
the second Bush administration, which dramatically increased their use in what 
many viewed as a frontal assault on the Congress’ legislative prerogative. This 
change caught the eyed of Boston Globe columnist Charlie Savage, who 
published a series of  Pulitzer Prize winning articles which criticized this practice 
as an example of an overreaching, “imperialistic” presidency. Savage observed 
that: 
Legal scholars say the scope and aggression of 
Bush’s assertions that he can bypass laws represent 
                                                 
10
 See, Steve Calabresi, memorandum for the Attorney General on 
Presidential Signing Statements, 23 Aug. 1985. 23 Sept. 2007 
<http://www.archives. gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/Acc060-
89-269-box3-SG-ChronologicalFile.pdf>. 
 
Walter Dellinger, memo to the Department of Justice, The Legal Significance 
of Presidential Signing Statements, 3 Nov. 1993. 12 Oct. 2007 <http://ww 
w.usdoj.gov/olc/signing.htm>. 
 
Samuel Alito Jr., memo to the Litigation Strategy Working Group, U.S. 
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, Washington, DC. 5 Feb. 1986. 
14 April 2007 <http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-
89-269/Acc060-89-269-box6-SG-LSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Feb1986.pdf>. 
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a concerted effort to expand his power at the 
expense of Congress, upsetting the balance between 
the branches of government. The Constitution is 
clear in assigning to Congress the power to write 
laws and to the president a duty “to take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed.” Bush, however, has 
repeatedly declared that he does not need to execute 
a law he believes is unconstitutional.   
 
Savage’s articles transformed President Bush’s use of signing statements into a 
national issue, and broadened the debate beyond inner political and legal circles to 
the public at large. As a result, not only were the views of Congress and the 
Executive Branch widely publicized, but many other views were aired. Editors of 
major newspapers addressed the issue on their op-ed pages, readers responded, 
and articles and papers on the subject appeared across a broad spectrum of 
publications.
11
 
- Separation of Powers: A Bedrock Constitutional Principle - 
 
The basic premise underlying the principle of separation of powers is 
easily stated. Forged in the kiln of the revolutionary movements of the eighteenth 
century and pounded into shape by the philosophers of the day – such as 
                                                 
11
 See, “Veto?  Who Needs a Veto?,” Editorial, New York Times 5 May 2006  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/05/opinion/05fril.html?th&emc=th> 
 
“A White House power grab,” Editorial, San Francisco Chronicle 12 June 2006 
<http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/200 6/06/12/E 
DGMSJ BOEJ1.DTL> 
 
“Signing statements an abuse of power,” Editorial, Asbury Park Press 6 June 
2006, <http://www.app.com/apps/pbcs.dll/art icle?AID=/200660 6/OPINI 
ON/606060313/1032> 
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Montesquieu – the concept was a cornerstone of the freedom movement whose 
goal was to prevent too much power from accumulating in the hands of too few. 
To do so, the legitimate powers of the government were to be separated into the 
different branches of government, with each providing a check against the others 
gaining too much power. 
This structure was adopted by the authors of the Constitution as a 
foundational principle upon which the structure of our government was to be 
anchored.  Recently divorced from English rule, the founders were acutely aware 
of the dangers of sovereign rule, and were determined not to re-create it in the 
form of an overly strong executive.  At the same time, however, they recognized 
the need for a functional central government with sufficient authority to meet the 
young country’s needs.  Indeed, there was little disagreement that the Articles of 
Confederation, to be replaced by the Constitution, were wholly inadequate on this 
score.  These competing concerns were advanced, on the one hand, by the 
Federalist or Hamiltonian camp that argued for a strong central government and 
president, and on the other by the Jeffersonians who did not want a dominant 
president—or central, federal government, for that matter-- and advocated for a 
decentralized government with as much power as possible residing in the states. 
Not surprisingly, these principles figured prominently in the debates 
leading up to the creation of the Constitution.  In The Federalist No. 51, James 
Madison noted that the separation of powers is “essential to the preservation of 
liberty.”
12
  Madison further observed in Federalist No.48 that the different 
                                                 
12 James Madison, Federalist No. 51: “The Structure of the Government Must 
Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments.” 
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branches must have control over one another in order to be “separate and 
distinct.”
13
  He very succinctly described how critical separation of powers was to 
the young democracy: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, 
and judiciary, in the same hands...may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny."
14
  In the end, the importance of having a strong national figurehead 
trumped the fear of putting too much power in the hands of one person.  The 
critical safeguard against a usurpation of power by the president was the separate 
powers entrusted to the judicial and legislative branches, and the system of checks 
and balances that resulted.  
In the end, all agreed upon a system of government that divided the key 
functions of government among the executive, legislative and judicial branches.  
The debate about how the system worked did not, however, end with the 
ratification of the Constitution.  Indeed, it is one of the great ironies of our 
political history that not even those men who had so carefully crafted our 
Constitution around the principle of separation of powers agreed on how that 
principle should be applied in practice.  Throughout the late eighteenth and early 
                                                                                                                                     
Independent Journal.  6 February 1788. 17 December 2007 < 
http://www.constitution.org/fed/ federa51.htm> 
 
13 James Madison. Federalist No. 48: “These Departments Should Not Be So Far 
Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other.” New York 
Packet. 1 February 1788. 17 December 2007 < 
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa48.htm> 
 
14 James Madison. Federalist No. 47: “The Particular Structure of the New 
Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts.” New York 
Packet. 30 January 1788.  9 January 2008 < 
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa47.htm> 
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nineteenth centuries, this issue was the subject of heated partisan debate between 
the Federalists and the Republicans. 
 Nor was there agreement on how disputes over constitutional 
interpretation should be resolved.  It is commonly understood today that the 
courts are the arbiters of the Constitution. But that was not the case immediately 
after the Constitution was ratified.  Indeed, it was commonly thought that 
constitutional questions were far too fundamental to be entrusted to federal judges 
who were not answerable to the people because they were appointed by the 
president and had life tenure, and who for the most part were partisan appointees 
of the party in power.  This issue was put to rest in 1803 by Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison.  The backdrop of Marbury was the 
bitter partisan divide following Jefferson’s defeat of Adams in 1800, and the 
actions of the lame-duck Federalists in passing the Judiciary Act and packing the 
judiciary with last minute Federalist appointments.  In addressing these issues, 
Marshall determined that while the appointments were consistent with the 
Judiciary Act, the Judiciary Act itself contravened the Constitution, and therefore 
could not be enforced.  In one fell swoop, Marshall declared the supremacy of the 
Constitution over any other law or act, and stated that it was the role of the 
judiciary alone to interpret the Constitution and determine when it was being 
infringed.  These propositions, so obvious today, were not at all obvious in the 
years following the Constitution’s birth.  
 While many disagreed with Marbury, its essential rulings never came 
under serious threat.  Subsequent Supreme Court decisions concerning separation 
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of powers confirmed and strengthened the judiciary’s role as the final arbiter of 
disputes over constitutional meaning.  As discussed below, however, many argue 
that there remains an important political role in constitutional construction, thus 
perpetuating (at a reduced level) the original debate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III 
 
SIGNING STATEMENTS & THE LAW: 
 
 
17 
Signing Statements Do Not 
Violate The Constitution 
 
 
Following the Savage articles, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) 
decided to enter the debate.  While it is the largest and most influential national 
organization of attorneys, the ABA has no formal, official role in resolving 
constitutional issues.  Nonetheless, its views on important legal and constitutional 
issues are quite influential.  For example, the ABA historically rates nominees to 
the Supreme Court and other important legal positions in terms of their 
qualifications, capabilities and experience. 
 In April of 2006, then ABA President Michael Greco established a non-
partisan task force comprised of judges, law professors and attorneys to study the 
issue and offer its conclusions and recommendations.  The Task Force issued its 
report in August 2006, in which it unanimously and unequivocally concluded that 
signing statements were unconstitutional.  Specifically, they voted to  
Oppose, as contrary to the rule of law and our 
constitutional system of separation of powers, a 
President’s issuance of signing statements to claim 
the authority or state the intention to disregard or 
decline to enforce all or part of a law he has signed, 
or to interpret such a law in a manner inconsistent 
with the clear intent of Congress.
15
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 “American Bar Association, Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and 
the Separation of Powers Doctrine, Report with Recommendations,” 5 (2006), 
<http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba_final_signing_ 
statements_recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf> 
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Based upon this conclusion, the Task Force passed several resolutions, including 
resolutions urging: 
 
• The President, if he believes that any 
provision of a bill pending before Congress would 
be unconstitutional if enacted to communicate such 
concerns to Congress prior to passage; 
• The President to confine any signing 
statements to his views regarding the meaning, 
purpose and significance of  bills presented by 
Congress, and that if he believes that all or part of a 
bill is unconstitutional, to veto the bill in 
accordance with Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of 
the United States, which directs him to approve or 
disapprove each bill in its entirety; 
• Congress to enact legislation requiring the 
President promptly to submit to Congress an 
official copy of all signing statements he issues, and 
in any instance in which he claims the authority, or 
states the intention, to disregard or decline to 
enforce all or part of a law he has signed, or to 
interpret such a law in a manner inconsistent with 
the clear intent of Congress, to submit to Congress 
a report setting forth in full the reasons and legal 
basis for the statement; and further requiring that 
all such submissions be available in a publicly 
accessible database; and  
• Congress to enact legislation enabling the 
President, Congress, or other entities or 
individuals, to seek judicial review, to the extent 
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constitutionally permissible, in any instance in 
which the President claims the authority, or states 
the intention, to disregard or decline to enforce all 
or part of a law he has signed, or interprets such a 
law in a manner inconsistent with the clear intent of 
Congress, and urges Congress and the President to 
support a judicial resolution of the President’s 
claim or intention.
16
 
   
Each of these recommendations was intended to obviate the political and legal 
tensions created by signing statements.  However, they spring from a faulty 
premise: that a president unconstitutionally usurps legislative authority from the 
legislative branch when he asserts his belief that aspects of the legislation are 
unconstitutional, and declares his intention not to enforce aspects of such 
legislation.  In fact, signing statements do not, in and of themselves, violate the 
Constitution, and to hold otherwise violates longstanding principles of 
constitutional interpretation, with potentially serious consequences.  There are 
four bases for this conclusion, each of which is addressed, in turn, below. 
1. Signing statements do not exceed the President’s constitutional authority, 
or usurp authority delegated to the other two branches. 
  
 Any argument that an action by one of the three branches of government 
violates the separation of powers must, by definition, be based upon a showing 
that the action exceeds the express delegation of authority under the Constitution 
                                                 
16
 Ibid. 
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and/or encroaches on the authority delegated to one of the other branches.  
Signing statements do neither. 
 In arguing that signing statements exceed the President’s designated 
authority, the Task Force first pointed to the limited role of the President in the 
legislative process. Under Article I, § 7, he must either sign or veto a bill that is 
passed by Congress and submitted to him under the Presentment Clause. The 
Task Force then argued that the president exceeds his authority when he signs a 
bill but indicates in a signing statement his position that one or more aspects of 
the bill are unconstitutional, or that he interprets one or more provisions 
differently than Congress.  Finally, the Task Force concluded that by so doing, the 
president violates his constitutional duty to faithfully execute the law.
17
 
These arguments ring hollow.  As a threshold matter, it is broadly 
accepted that while the Constitution was designed around the separation of 
powers principle, that separation is not, and was never intended to be, absolute 
and complete. One constitutional scholar has described the relationship as more of 
a ‘mingling’ than a separation: 
Although it is a misnomer as a matter of intellectual 
history, “separation of powers” is often used as a 
shorthand phrase for the complex system of checks 
and balances created by the Constitution—checks 
and balances that in fact mingle the different types 
of governmental power.  To be sure, the 
Constitution provides that Congress is given “[a]ll 
the legislative powers herein granted,” that “the 
                                                 
17
 Ibid. 
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Executive power” is vested in the President, and 
that “the Judicial Power of the United States” is 
vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts 
created by Congress. But the Constitution does not 
itself define “legislative,” “executive,” or 
“judicial” powers, and the functions assigned to 
each branch belie any suggestion that the 
Constitution establishes a strict separation.
18
 
 
With respect to the legislative power, while primary responsibility for legislation 
falls to Congress, it is universally recognized that the president does have a 
constitutional role in legislation.  That role begins, at a minimum, with the power 
to sign or veto legislation under the Presentment Clause, and many view it as 
extending into a much broader range of legislative roles. One commentator 
identifies no fewer than fifteen areas in which the Constitution arguably confers 
legislative authority on the President. 
19
  However enumerated, it is clear that the 
President has some role in legislation, and therefore the premise that signing 
statements are unconstitutional because they involve legislation cannot withstand 
scrutiny. 
Moreover, the argument that the President must either veto a bill in its 
entirety or sign it and then execute each and every portion of it with equal rigor is 
unpersuasive. The conditions under which the President should either sign or veto 
                                                 
18 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law Third ed. Vol. 1. (New York: 
West Publishing Company, 1999) 137. 
 
19 Theodore Olson, “Presidential Lawmaking Powers: Vetoes, Line Item Vetoes, 
Signing Statements, Executive Orders, and Delegations of Rulemaking Authority,” 
Washington University Law Quarterly (1990). 
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a bill are not defined in the Constitution. Nowhere does it say or suggest that he 
must veto a bill he believes presents constitutional issues, or that by signing a bill 
he waives such concerns.  And the view that a president must enforce a statutory 
provision he believes to be unconstitutional is difficult to justify as a 
constitutional mandate. But these arguments necessarily underlie the Task Force’s 
position, which would eliminate a president’s ability to reserve his constitutional 
concerns for a later time, and require him to veto an entire bill if he had potential 
concerns about some aspect of the bill.  Not only is this mandate nowhere to be 
found in the Constitution, but it runs directly counter to the president’s obligation 
to uphold the Constitution.  It could also very well lead to an unworkable 
legislative process, as the President would feel compelled to veto bills with much 
greater frequency to protect his position, even if it is highly unlikely that his 
concerns will come to pass for any single piece of legislation. This would be 
particularly unworkable in the realities of modern legislation, which are often in 
the form of omnibus bills containing thousands of provisions.  
Similarly, the President’s expressed concerns over the constitutionality of 
a provision, and a stated intention to interpret it in a certain way and/or not to 
execute it under certain circumstances, create only the possibility of a conflict in 
the future.  Indeed, in comparison to the number of signing statements issued, 
only a small portion have actually resulted in a dispute.  A stated difference of 
opinion that may, at some future time and under circumstances that may or may 
not come to pass, lead to a refusal by the president to execute the law as intended 
by Congress simply is not a violation of separation of powers. 
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 Finally, signing statements do not usurp the legislative function from 
Congress.  They do not interfere with the ability of Congress to pass legislation 
and present it to the president, or to override his veto if he should exercise it. 
While it is understandable that Congress does not like the practice and the 
president’s broad use of it, in fact it has had minimal impact in the execution of its 
legislation by the president.  It is well recognized that each branch has a 
legitimate interest in protecting its authority and arguing for an expanded 
interpretation of its authority relative to the other branches.  The branches are 
unlikely to ever reach agreement on their respective powers.  To require that all 
such disputes be resolved finally through the veto process would likely bring the 
legislative process to a standstill.  And while it is true that once the president has 
acted it may be difficult to resolve the dispute, as discussed below an actual 
controversy can be resolved in the courts. 
2. Signing statements have no legal effect. 
 Signing statements are not law, and do not embody any action by the 
president at the time they are made. To the extent they are an effort to influence 
judicial construction of statutes, they have been woefully unsuccessful. In 
Hamdan v Rumsfeld (2006), the Court held that presidential signing statements 
containing the president’s proposed interpretation of a statute are virtually 
irrelevant when it comes to determining the intent behind a statute.
20
  
 It is difficult to argue that an action by one of the branches that has no 
effect at the time it was taken somehow infringes upon the authority of one of the 
                                                 
20 Hamdan V. Rumsfeld. No. 05-184. Supreme Court of the United States. 29 
June 2006. 9 Jan. 2008 <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-
184.pdf>. 
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other branches.  If and when the president decides to not enforce a statutory 
provision, or to apply it in a manner contrary to Congress’ intent, then—and only 
then—is there a basis for challenge. 
3.  Signing statements are not justiciable at the time they are issued. 
 Article III of the Constitution limits the power of the judiciary to decide 
only actual “cases or controversies.”  This provision requires that someone 
seeking judicial review of government action must be able to show that they have 
suffered some form of concrete harm. Closely related to the ‘case or controversy’ 
requirement are other requirements that relate to whether or not an issue is 
capable of being adjudicated. They include standing, requiring that the party 
bringing suit personally be in a position to bring suit; ripeness, requiring that the 
issue to be adjudicated has actually occurred; and mootness, requiring that a 
controversy still be alive at the time of adjudication.  Together, these principles 
embody the concept of justiciability. 
 The Supreme Court addressed the justiciability issue in the context of 
separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches in Raines v. 
Byrd. After voting against the Line Item Veto Act giving the President the power 
to selectively veto specific portions of a spending bill, several members of 
Congress filed suit against members of the executive branch charged with 
enforcing the Act. They claimed that granting the President the ability to veto 
specific portions of a bill, rather that the entire bill as provided in the Constitution, 
diluted their legislative authority under Article I. The Supreme Court dismissed 
their case, ruling that the members had failed to identify the sort of particularized, 
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concrete harm to themselves necessary to present a ‘case or controversy’ as 
required by Article III. 
 The same barrier prevents Congress from challenging signing statements 
in the courts.  The ABA Task Force, and others critical of signing statements, 
point to this justiciability problem in support of their argument that signing 
statements violate separation of powers principles. But this is a non-sequitor. The 
fact that Congress cannot challenge signing statements under Article III has 
nothing to do with whether they encroach upon Congress’ Article I authority.  
- Final Statement on Constitutionality - 
 Numerous complex legal arguments can be made for or against the 
constitutionality of signing statements.  Because the focus of this paper is 
primarily on the policy rather than the legality of signing statements, the 
arguments above assume that the balance of all the legal debates suggest signing 
statements are legitimate under the Constitution.  Under this condition, the next 
section of this paper will examine how signing statements are an example of a bad 
policy despite being constitutional.   
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Presidential Signing Statements as Policy 
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THE MODERN USE OF SIGNING STATEMENTS 
The Utilization of Signing Statements to Expand Presidential Power 
 
IV 
 
The conclusion that the Bush administration’s broad use of signing 
statements is not unconstitutional when made does not end the controversy that 
surrounds them. They still arguably represent a unilateral power grab by the 
executive branch at the expense of Congress, as Savage characterizes them in his 
articles.
21
  They continue to foster resentment in Congress and a seriously reduced 
willingness to work cooperatively with the President. And while the ABA 
overreached in its conclusion with respect to the constitutionality of signing 
statements, its analysis, conclusions and recommendations reflect a widespread 
belief that the administration’s actions are inappropriate. In short, while signing 
statements may not violate the letter of the Constitution and the separation of 
powers principles upon which it was built, there remains a strong argument that 
they violate the spirit of these principles, and have a corrosive effect on the 
delicate balance that the drafters so carefully crafted.  
A. Political Construction of the Constitution and Resulting Policy. 
 From the very moment the Constitution was ratified, debates have raged 
over the respective authority, and limits thereon, of the three branches. This is 
particularly true as between the executive and legislative branches, reflecting a 
continuation of the original constitutional debate over the need for a strong 
                                                 
21 See, Charlie Savage’s series of articles regarding signing statements available 
from http://www.boston.com/news/specials/savage_signing_statements/  
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executive, contrasted with the importance of a strong legislative body to keep the 
executive in check. Indeed, it has become an accepted, and expected, role of each 
branch to take an expansive view of its authority, and defend that view as against 
the other branches. In his book Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and 
Constitutional Meaning, Keith B. Whittington examines this dynamic not as a 
marginal product of partisan politics, but rather as an integral component of 
constitutional construction and the evolution thereof. Whittington posits that the 
traditional analysis of constitutional construction in strictly legal terms misses a 
significant aspect of how our understanding of the Constitution has, and should 
be, developed.  He asserts: 
The bridge from Constitutionalism to judicial 
supremacy has been built on the contention that the 
courts are preeminently the American “forum of 
principle,” whereas the non-judicial arenas are 
characterized by a politics of power driven by 
conflicting interests and assertions of will. 
Unfortunately, that bridge depended more on 
caricatures drawn by academic lawyers than on the 
examination of historical political experience. The 
role of the Court will have to be situated within a 
context of competing claims to constitutional 
authority and alternative visions of appropriate 
constitutional meaning.
22
 
 
The principal “non-judicial arenas” to which Whittington refers are the political 
arenas in which skirmishes routinely take place over the authority, and limitations 
                                                 
22 Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and 
Constitutional Meaning (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999) 209. 
 
 
29 
thereon, of the executive and legislative branches, respectively.  Fueled by 
“political will” and advanced by “explicit advocates,” these skirmishes “display 
none of the objectivity valued in the jurisprudential model” of constitutional 
construction.
23
    
 Whittingon’s view that political constitutional construction is desirable 
and necessary is undoubtedly at odds with a ‘strict constructionist’ view of 
constitutional interpretation, which would not only limit construction to the 
judiciary, but strictly limit the judiciary’s role and flexibility.  Regardless of 
whether political construction should occur, however, it no doubt does. And the 
battle over signing statements provides a concrete example of  “[a]mbitious 
political actors” construing the constitution “in order to find support for their own 
political interests and [constructing] a vision of constitutional meaning that 
enshrines their own values and interests.” 
24
 
B. The Evolution of Signing Statements as Policy – From Reagan to George 
W. Bush. 
 
 In order to properly evaluate signing statements as acts of political 
construction, it is necessary to understand the policy goals and implications that 
they entail, and to trace the development of the policy and the underlying context. 
As discussed above, signing statements were used only sporadically prior to the 
1980’s.  Beginning with the Reagan administration and continuing to the present, 
presidents have increasingly used signing statements in a planned, strategic 
manner. This change was not accidental. It arose out of conflicts between the 
                                                 
23 Ibid, 210. 
 
24 Ibid, 207. 
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executive and legislative branches over legislative policy, which prompted 
attorneys and policymakers in the executive branch to develop constitutional 
theories supporting use of signing statements as a tool against Congress.  A 
review of the analyses underlying these theories and how they evolved over time 
provides some insight into the development and use of signing statements as 
policy, and how each administration intended to use signing statements to 
enhance presidential power. 
 An analytical framework within which to evaluate this policy development 
is also useful.  Presidents have used different forms of executive power to 
influence legislation.  Academic studies examining the modern presidency have 
focused on the different means by which presidents use their power to push their 
personal agendas through the legislative branch.  The three principal theories that 
relate to how presidents (since Reagan) have issued signing statements as policy 
are: the power to persuade Congress; appealing to the electorate in order to gain 
support; and unilateral presidential action.
25
   
After World War II the president became more widely recognized as the 
“chief legislator” due to the important role held in the legislative process.
26
  From 
this idea of a legislative presidency Neustadt, Kernell and Howell have identified 
three commonly accepted forms effective presidential leadership.  In 1960, 
Neustadt wrote a study on presidential power that concluded “presidential power 
                                                 
25 William G. Howell, Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential 
Action (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003). 
 
26 Roger H. Davidson, and Walter J. Oleszek. Congress and Its Members 10th ed. 
(Washington DC: CQ P, 2006) 306. 
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is the power to persuade.”
27
  Neustadt’s conception of presidential power became 
an influential study of the presidency.  Kernell’s theory of going public to gain 
support and Howell’s unilateral action model are both derived from Neustadt’s 
study of presidential power.  These different forms of presidential power have 
branched off from Neustadt’s original conception to test the water of expansive 
presidential powers.  Likewise, they have been applied to signing statements in an 
attempt to utilize their full potential as a form of persuasion. 
While the president holds many formal and informal powers to influence 
legislation, signing statements have encompassed the three listed above.  
Understanding the use of signing statements in terms of these theories will 
demonstrate how the signing statement, as a policy, has fundamentally changed in 
its general purpose and implementation from its origins in the Reagan 
administration to the presidency of George W. Bush.  Indeed, the transformation 
of the signing statement by the Bush administration into a broad-based, unilateral 
effort to co-opt power to the president fundamentally changed the debate around 
this issue. 
-Ronald Reagan- 
 Steven Calabresi and John Harrison, two young attorneys in the Office of 
Legal Counsel under President Reagan, are generally credited as the first people 
to propose the strategic use of signing statements as a policy tool for increasing 
executive power.  According to Calabresi and Harrison, judges notoriously abused 
legislative history when interpreting laws and ignored the stance of the president 
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when making their decisions.
28
  On August 23, 1985, the two young lawyers sent 
a memorandum to Attorney General Ed Meese, suggesting that signing statements 
can be used to put the president’s interpretation of a law on record and, in effect, 
take away Congress’ monopoly over legislative interpretation.
29
  As a direct result 
of this memorandum, Attorney General Meese arranged for the West Publishing 
Company – the company that publishes official legislative history – to publish 
presidential signing statements along with legislative history.
30
  Subsequent 
memoranda circulated through the Department of Justice suggested that the 
signing statement was a severely underutilized tool for the president to counteract 
Congress’ legislative supremacy.   
The ideology behind this approach was that the very existence of signing 
statements would give the administration leverage over Congress in legislative 
matters and would, in turn, make Congress more willing to compromise with the 
president.  Another behind-the-scenes framer of this new approach to signing 
statements was then Assistant Attorney General Ralph Tarr.  Tarr insisted on 
using signing statements to influence how agencies interpret statutes, to inform 
Congress of a problematic or unconstitutional provision and to make the 
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executive’s position available to judges.
31
  These internal memoranda suggest that 
the original intent of signing statements as policy was to keep pace with an 
overbearing Congress.  If that is actually the case then it becomes important to 
quickly analyze the relationship between Congress and the Reagan administration. 
Reagan began his presidential career with relative success in passing his 
agenda though Congress.  He was able to successfully pass his budget priorities in 
1981, but found it difficult get most of his agenda through Congress after that, 
especially in his second term.
32
  Prior to the 1983 Supreme Court case INS v. 
Chadha, Congress used legislative vetoes – an act by Congress that removed 
powers granted to the executive branch – to broaden its power by having control 
over executive agencies.  And, even after the Supreme Court found legislative 
vetoes to be unconstitutional, Congress frequently acted with hostility toward the 
administration instead of cooperating in order to pass legislation.  Reagan 
subsequently set up meetings with congressmen and negotiated compromises and 
agreements in order to move his agenda forward.
33
  Signing statements emerged 
from Reagan’s legal department as a tool for the president to coerce cooperation 
from legislators, pass his agenda and to assert the president’s authority as chief 
ruler of the executive branch.   
With these intentions in mind, the signing statement under Reagan 
represents a form of presidential power envisioned by Richard Neustadt.  
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Neustadt is an expert on the American Presidency, has been a presidential advisor 
for three decades, and is a professor in the Kennedy School of Government at 
Harvard University.  Neustadt submits that presidents use their inherent skill sets 
to influence legislation by bargaining with Congress.  He recognizes Reagan’s 
skills as a likable and effective communicator that enabled him to consistently 
come off in a positive light in the public and the media, skills that produced 
approval ratings consistently around 65 percent for much of his tenure.
34
  
Reagan’s use of signing statements, however, did not utilize this skill set; rather, 
they were primarily used as leverage against Congress –a form of bargaining – 
and kept out of the media.  Viewed through Neustadt’s theory of presidential 
power, the Reagan administration’s approach used signing statements as a way to 
stake their territory in the executive branch and to influence legislation through 
the power of persuasion.  According to William Howell, “Neustadt’s original 
formulation of presidential power remains conventional wisdom -- presidents are 
powerful to the extent that they can drive their legislative agendas through 
Congress, bargain with bureaucrats, and breed loyalty within their 
administrations.”
35
  Facing repeated opposition and increased power in Congress, 
the new and increased use of signing statements by the Reagan administration can 
be seen as a formal means of the president asserting his power of persuasion in 
order to keep up with a legislative branch that controlled the lawmaking process. 
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-George H. W. Bush (Bush I)- 
 The first Bush administration followed a similar strategy to the Reagan 
administration regarding signing statements, with the primary objective being to 
increase his influence over legislation using the power of persuasion.  However, 
the Justice Department had become much more organized addressing signing 
statements since Calabresi and Harrison’s memorandum in 1985, and the process 
of issuing signing statements became much more formulaic.  This re-organization 
can be traced to another executive branch memorandum, this one authored by 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General under President Reagan, Samuel Alito, and 
sent to the Litigation Strategy Working Group.  Alito’s memorandum set forth a 
plan to slowly implement the use of signing statements as a regular policy, and 
forewarned of the possible oppositions this policy faced.  Alito took the view that 
because the president inherently plays a major role in the passage and execution 
of legislation, the interpretation of the president should be as important and hold 
as much weight as legislative history.   
 Alito’s proposal strategically laid out how the administration should go 
about issuing signing statements to achieve the goal of expanding presidential 
influence over the legislative process.  Alito’s memorandum lists five possible 
obstacles to the enhanced use of signing statements: (1) the limited amount of 
resources available; (2) the president only has ten days to issue a signing 
statement after receiving a bill from Congress; (3) Congress will most likely have 
a negative reaction to the use of signing statements; (4) the possibility of 
reluctance by executive departments and agencies; and (5) the theoretical issues 
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(legal concerns) regarding the president’s role in the legislative process.
36
  
Following is Alito’s proposal to most effectively deal with these obstacles: 
C. A Proposal.  
In view of the concerns noted above, I would make 
the following recommendation.  
 
- As an introductory step, the Department should 
seek to have interpretive signing statements issued 
for a reasonable number of bills that fall within  
its own field of responsibility. By concentrating at 
first on a small number of bills, we can begin 
without a commitment of resources that would  
necessitate major changes in staffing. And by 
concentrating on bills within our own field of 
responsibility and concern, we can begin without 
depending upon the cooperation of other 
departments and agencies, which may be  
skeptical at first. If our project is successful, 
cooperation may be more readily available.  
 
- For use in this pilot project, we should try to 
identify bills that (a) are reasonably likely to pass, 
(b) are of some importance, and (c) are likely  
to present suitable problems of interpretation.  
 
- Again, as an introductory step, our  
interpretive statements should be of moderate size 
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and scope. Only relatively important questions 
should be addressed. We should concentrate on  
points of true ambiguity, rather than issuing 
interpretations that may seem to conflict with those 
of Congress. The first step will be to convince the  
courts that Presidential signing statements are 
valuable interpretive tools.  
- It would also be very helpful, as pointed out in 
Steve Calabresi's memorandum of January 27, 
1986, to include in each signing statement a  
section spelling out the grant of authority to the 
federal government on which the statute rests.  
 
- The most important step will be approval of this 
project by the President. Obviously there can be no 
project unless the President wishes to sign  
interpretive statements of the type we envision. For 
the purpose of presenting this issue to the President, 
it may be helpful if we draft a sample of a new-  
style signing statement either for a bill that is now 
pending before Congress or one that was recently 
enacted. Also, as a first step, the proposal should be  
discussed with White House counsel.  
 
- The Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental 
Affairs seems the logical unit within the Department 
to coordinate our efforts. In particular, OLIA 
should be able to identify appropriate bills as they 
proceed through Congress. The actual selection  
of the bills may then be done, in cooperation with 
OLIA, by this Group as a whole, a subgroup, or 
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some other body. Once appropriate bills have been 
chosen, components of the Department with  
expertise regarding the particular bills  
selected should be asked for their views. For 
example, OLC should be consulted, as it now is, 
when constitutional questions are raised. OLIA 
should assemble and coordinate the responses of 
the various units.  
 
- Because of the time problems previously noted, the 
drafting of our pilot signing statements should 
begin well before final passage of the bills. 
Moreover, if Presidential signing statements are 
ever to achieve much importance, I think it will be 
necessary to escape from the requirement of having 
to complete our work prior to the signing of the bill. 
Accordingly, after the first few efforts, the President 
could merely state when signing the bill that  
his signing is based on an /*/0-63. Bt the pressure 
to complete a formal statement for public release 
would be relieved. This procedure would mirror the 
procedure followed by congressional committees, 
which vote out proposed legislation long before the 
committee report is issued.  
 
- The Department should continue and should 
intensify its internal consideration of the theoretical 
problems posed by the proposed expanded role for 
Presidential signing statements. Once a few  
signing statements of this new type have been 
issued, discussion in legal journals may be, 
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stimulated and should be encouraged.
37
  
 
Thus, Alito was cognizant of both the potential to expand presidential power 
through signing statements, and the potential pitfalls that this strategy could 
entail.  The in-depth strategizing that went into this effort exemplifies the 
complexity and controversy surrounding such a policy, and the obstacles that 
Alito identifies are partially what limit signing statements from being effective 
policy. The underlying point is that Samuel Alito’s proposition opened the door 
for the expansion of signing statements but it did so on some precarious grounds.   
President George H. W. Bush’s administration took the stance that the 
presidency had been losing much of the power that was originally intended by the 
framers because of increasing congressional dominance in the legislative process.  
Bush’s attorney general, Richard Thornburgh, argued to the Federalist Society in 
1990 that the president did not have as much power in the legislative process as 
he used to.  In his speech Thornburgh claimed: 
Today’s legislative process has rendered the 
presidential veto a less effective check on 
congressional encroachments than was envisioned 
two centuries ago…It is often very difficult for the 
President to veto legislation that contains 
sometimes blatantly unconstitutional provisions.  
For example, Congress has become fond of 
inserting substantive provisions in appropriations 
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bills.  This is what they call making the provision 
veto-proof.
38
 
 
This statement illustrates the sentiment held by the White House at the time that 
Congress had the upper hand in lawmaking by using legislative loopholes.  It is 
because of this continued struggle for power between Congress and the executive 
branch that the first Bush administration used Alito’s strategy as a foundation for 
their use of signing statements. 
 While still using the signing statement as a form of persuasion (as 
envisioned by Neustadt) against Congress, the first Bush administration began 
expanding its use of signing statements and became much more strategically 
organized in issuing them.  This resulted in the first Bush administration utilizing 
signing statements more than the Reagan administration – challenging 232 
sections of bills – but not significantly changing the intended purpose of the 
signing statement as a form of presidential policy.  
 It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of signing statements during the 
Reagan and first Bush administration because there is no empirical evidence 
available describing how signing statements affected lawmakers.  It can be 
assumed that they were not very effective because there are very few writings 
from that time on signing statements and no references to them in court decisions.  
The ineffectiveness of signing statements as a form of persuasion may be why the 
Clinton administration used a different strategy in implementing them. 
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-Clinton-   
 President Clinton’s use of signing statements demonstrates that their use 
transcends party lines.  The signing statement is an instrument used in the 
institutional power struggle between the executive and legislative branches; it can 
and has been used by presidents of each party. The extent to which partisan 
politics play a role in signing statements is apparent when ideological polarization 
exists between the President and Congress, restricting the ability of the president 
to pass his policy agenda through the legislature.  This was the case for President 
Clinton through most of his tenure as president.  Dealing with a Republican led 
Congress through most of his two terms, President Clinton resorted to signing 
statements in order to set his agenda against a hostile Congress. 
39
 
 Clinton, however, followed a slightly different approach than presidents 
Reagan and Bush.  While the first Bush administration primarily meant for the 
signing statements to be seen by Congress and courts, President Clinton also 
wanted the public to be made aware of his stances on legislation through signing 
statements.  According to a letter from Walter Dellinger, head of the Office of 
Legal Counsel under President Clinton: 
 
If the President may properly decline to enforce a 
law, at least when it unconstitutionally encroaches 
on his powers, then it arguably follows that he may 
properly announce to Congress and to the public 
that he will not enforce a provision of an enactment 
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he is signing. If so, then a signing statement that 
challenges what the President determines to be an 
unconstitutional encroachment on his power, or 
that announces the President's unwillingness to 
enforce (or willingness to litigate) such a provision, 
can be a valid and reasonable exercise of 
Presidential authority.
40
 
 
Thus, the Clinton administration used signing statements not only as a form of 
persuasion, but also to gain support from the public.  This represents a slightly 
different approach to achieving the same end:  passing the presidential agenda 
through Congress.  The President, being the solitary nationally elected official, 
often faces public scrutiny when he cannot make changes or pass laws promised 
in his campaign.  When it is others (i.e. Congress) who are holding back such 
agendas, the President can go directly to the public in an attempt to gain support 
against the actor(s) blocking the presidential agenda.   
Samuel Kernell, a professor of political science at the University of 
California, San Diego, has termed this new presidential strategy as “going 
public.”   When used under Neustadt’s model, signing statements (at least as 
originally viewed in the Reagan Justice Department) would be used as leverage, 
but would still promote bargaining and some form of cooperation.  According to 
Kernell, going public “violates” bargaining by circumventing exchanges between 
the two branches.  However, Kernell believes that practiced in an appropriate 
manner, going public can displace bargaining.  Another major difference between 
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going public and the power of persuasion is that going public is much more 
combative.
41
  Instead of bi-lateral bargaining to reach an agreement, going public 
involves bringing the public in as a third party to the process, implicitly 
threatening members of Congress with electoral consequences if they do not 
cooperate.   
        By going public with signing statements, the Clinton administration was 
exploring a different manner in which signing statements could be used to the 
president’s advantage, in an effort to render them a more effective tool of 
persuasion than they were under Bush and Reagan.  A valid question to ask here 
is: if signing statements were made public by Clinton over a decade ago, why was 
there little, if any, public controversy about them at the time?  The answer to this 
question correlates with the same reasons that Kernell’s strategy proved 
ineffective with signing statements.  First, the Clinton administration challenged 
only 140 sections of law, 92 fewer than the first Bush administration.
42
  If the 
number of challenges had continued on an upward trend, there may have been 
more of a public concern, but the declining trend diminished the thought of any 
real threat.   
 Second, the Clinton administration was inconsistent and never fully 
expanded the use of signing statements to the level foreseen by Alito.  For 
example, after attaching a signing statement to a bill that would remove all those 
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testing positive for HIV from the military, Dellinger and White House Counsel 
Jack Quinn told reporters that it was the position of the administration that the 
president was forced to execute the law as written unless the Supreme Court 
intervened and said otherwise.
43
  By going public here, the administration avoided 
vetoing a bill, but let the public know at the same time that it disagreed with some 
provisions of the bill.  Its position could possibly mobilize constituents who 
disagree with the bill to write their congressmen, or a person affected by the bill 
could take the government to court.  The Clinton administration saw that these 
possibilities alone might make some legislators change their mind and could assist 
in passing the president’s agenda.  But due to the lack of consistency by the 
president’s employment of signing statements there was not a strong public 
reaction.
44
  And due to the position of the Clinton administration that signing 
statements held no standing unless a Supreme Court Justice rules on them, there 
was no concern that the president would be acting unilaterally outside of the 
system of checks and balances. 
 Third, the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 granted Clinton the power to veto 
specific lines of certain bills passed through Congress.  With this power, Clinton 
had little need to use signing statements as line-item vetoes – one of the largest 
criticisms of the practice.  In 1998, the Supreme Court ruled that the use of the 
line-item veto was unconstitutional in the case Clinton v. City of New York. This 
decision may have reinforced the idea in the public’s mind that the Court was 
keeping tabs on the expansion of presidential powers. 
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 Finally, Kernell acknowledges that for numerous reasons, going public is 
not always effective.
45
  Going public with signing statements as a policy to 
advance the president’s agenda was ineffective for many of those same reasons.  
At the time, the signing statement was a little known political tool in which the 
public had very little interest.  On top of that, Clinton never touched on the issue 
of signing statements in a national address, suggesting that while the goal of the 
Clinton administration was to go public with signing statements, it was not 
prepared to make it a major issue.  The lack of interest and the minimal media 
coverage along with the other factors made the use of signing statements used by 
Clinton relatively ineffective and, in turn, unimportant to the public.   
While Clinton wanted signing statements to gain public support for his 
agenda, his attempts to do so were ultimately futile.  The ineffectiveness of the 
signing statement under Kernell’s theory of going public makes it a bad policy 
because it ultimately has little to no impact on legislation.  In trying to make the 
idea of the signing statement palatable to the public, it lost its leverage as a 
bargaining chip. 
-George W. Bush (Bush II)- 
 The use of signing statements by President George W. Bush became 
controversial for two main reasons. One reason was the dramatic increase in the 
sheer number of signing statements.  In his first six years in office, President Bush 
challenged more than 800 statutory provisions in his signing statements; all 
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previous presidents combined issued fewer than 600 such challenges.
46
  Along 
with the inordinate number of signing statements issued by President Bush, he 
issued an unusually low number of vetoes.  Seven years into office, President 
Bush had vetoed only two bills presented to him by Congress.  Even the prior 
three presidents who used constitutional signing statements continued to use their 
veto power; Clinton vetoed 37 bills during his tenure, George H.W. Bush vetoed 
44 and Reagan vetoed 78 over his two terms.
47
  This downward trend in the 
utilization of presidential veto power tends to support Thornburgh’s position that 
the veto had lost much of its power, and administrations were searching for other 
avenues to exert the office’s power (signing statements being one of the major 
policies).  Combined, the lack of vetoes and overexpansion of constitutional 
signing statements raised a red flag. 
 The second reason signing statements became more of a concern in the 
second Bush administration is that they were implemented as a unilateral 
presidential action.  Using the signing statement to go public or as a form of 
persuasion were very informal ways of bargaining with Congress.  However, 
unilateral actions by the president come off as much more finite and aggressive.  
William Howell, a professor of public policy at the Harris School at the 
University of Chicago, points out that one of the most effective ways presidents 
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go beyond being merely a veto player is to act unilaterally in making policy.
48
  
Howell’s book, Power Without Persuasion, focuses on the presidential strategy of 
acting unilaterally to create policy and push an agenda forward.  The major 
difference between this strategy and the other two is that instead of trying to 
influence the legislative process, unilateral action attempts to circumvent it.
49
  The 
extent to which unilateral action will be effective depends upon the institutional 
constraints placed upon the executive branch by Congress and the judiciary.
50
  In 
the case of Bush’s signing statements, the constraints were fairly restrictive when 
the president’s policy became clearer.  For example, none of Bush’s signing 
statements have held weight in a court decision.  In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the 
Court specifically rejected the principles established in one of Bush’s signing 
statements.  Also, in January of 2007, the House of Representatives Committee on 
the Judiciary and the Senate Judiciary Committee both held hearings examining 
the use of signing statements under President George W. Bush.  These hearings 
along with Senator Arlen Specter’s (R –PA) proposal – embodied in The 
Presidential Signing Statement Act of 2006 – to limit the power of signing 
statements illustrate the backlash Bush’s use of signing statements have caused in 
Congress.   
 Deputy Assistant Attorney General Michelle E. Boardman’s testimony 
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary provides insight into the Bush 
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administration’s intentions when issuing signing statements.  Boardman argued in 
the hearing that signing statements were good for separation of powers because it 
created dialogue between the branches.
51
  The resulting dialog, however, focused 
on signing statements as unilateral actions and not on the substantive issues 
surrounding the bills to which the signing statements were attached.  If signing 
statements actually initiated discussions on bills between the President and 
Congress then the signing statements would be effectively fulfilling part their 
original purpose.  However, the unilateral use of signing statements under Bush 
has incited more conflict between the branches than cooperation and bargaining.  
 In response to the Bush II administration citing his memorandum to 
defend their use of signing statements, former Assistant Attorney General Walter 
Dellinger wrote an Op-Ed piece to the New York Time explaining why the Bush 
administration’s use of signing statements have been misguided.  Dellinger first 
points out that the American Bar Association has misdiagnosed signing 
statements as being the problem when the real problem is the president’s 
constitutional interpretations.
52
  This was an issue that was never a problem when 
signing statements were used as a form of persuasion or for going public.  
Dellinger had assumed the president is always afforded the ability to refuse to 
enforce unconstitutional laws and, according to Dellinger:  
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A president’s ability to decline to enforce 
unconstitutional laws is an important safeguard of 
both separation of powers and individual liberty…If 
a president may decline to execute an 
unconstitutional law enacted before he assumed 
office, he should retain that right in the case of an 
unconstitutional provision of a bill he signs himself.  
Of course, if presented with a bill that is entirely 
unconstitutional, the proper response is a veto.
53
  
 
Under these assumptions, the sole purpose of a signing statement is to actually 
place a check on Congressional actions.  It has been more difficult in the modern 
presidency to use the veto as the lone check on bills passed through Congress, 
especially with the amount of multiprovision and omnibus legislation – the 
signing statement offers a “valuable and lawful alternative” to vetoing one of 
these bills.
54
  From this, Dellinger concludes that the real risk is not the signing 
statement but the unilateral authority Bush assumes from the use of signing 
statements.  Bush clearly ignores Dellinger’s warnings that the president should 
presume most laws are legitimate and exercise great deference to Congress’ 
positions on a provision’s constitutionality.  When these warnings are strictly 
heeded, the risk that a president will “assert a dubious claim of unconstitutionality 
in order to sidestep a law he simply doesn’t like” will likely go way down.
55
  
Dellinger’s letter to the New York Times illustrates how the strategic 
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implementation of a policy can clearly change the original intention behind it.  
The Bush II administration’s decision to issue signing statements as unilateral 
actions was ineffective as a policy because it altered the purpose of the original 
policy and it created more tension with Congress. 
 The Bush II administration systematically dove into legislation looking for 
any possible section of a bill a signing statement could be attached to – using 
minimal deference. They created an assembly line of attorneys whose job it was 
to read through legislation and identify any provision that could conceivably limit 
presidential power, and thus was a candidate for a signing statement. Before any 
signing statement could be presented to the president, it had to go through the 
Office of the Vice President – an office that had never before had any 
involvement in the process of issuing signing statements.
56
   Thus, the Bush II 
administration’s primary goal of signing statements had shifted from pushing the 
presidential agenda forward, to instituting a unitary executive.   
 The idea of a unitary executive, in short, is to limit the powers of Congress 
while endowing the president with absolute control over the executive branch. 
This simplified theory along with the types of provisions President Bush 
challenged can provide a better understanding of why he used signing statements 
the way he did. 
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Neil Kinkopf, an Associate Professor of Law at Georgia State University College 
of Law, and Peter Shane, the Director of the Project on Law and Democratic 
Development at the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, compiled a 
data set of signing statements under President George W. Bush organized by the 
category of objection: 
 
 
Source: Kinkopf, Neil, and Peter Shane. Index of Presidential Signing Statements: 
2001- 2007. American Constitution Society for Law and Policy. Advance, 2007. 
12 Mar. 2008 <http://www.acslaw.org/files/Signing%20Statement%20C 
hart%20-%20Neil%20Kinkopf %20and%20Peter%20Shane.pdf>. 
 
This table provides 23 objections and highlights five major categories of  
objections that were continuously used in signing statements under the second 
Bush administration.  These five objections were the recommendations clause, 
 
 
52 
bicameralism and presentment, unitary executive, presidential authority over 
foreign affairs and the executive privilege to withhold information (especially 
issues relating to national security and classified information).  Issues regarding 
the authority of the president as commander-in-chief were also used numerous 
times.  The categories challenged in these signing statements represent 
constitutional issues of presidential power.  One of the primary objectives of 
signing statements under the three administrations before George W. Bush was to 
avoid executing provisions of laws that were unconstitutional.  By using signing 
statements as a unilateral action, one of his primary objectives was to redefine the 
constitutional powers of the president. Asserting constitutional powers through 
signing statements is not only unfounded but it makes an already ineffective 
policy even less palatable. 
 In short, the Bush II administration transformed the signing statement 
from a surgical instrument used to advance the president’s legislative agenda in 
carefully selected areas, to a blunt axe used wherever and whenever possible in 
order to expand and re-define presidential power generally.  It is clear that by 
implementing signing statements as a form of unilateral presidential authority, 
President Bush deviated from the original intent of signing statements.  It was this 
use of signing statements that ignited Charlie Savage’s Pulitzer Prize winning 
articles on signing statements and raised controversy over the practice.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
V 
 
AN INEFFECTIVE POLICY: 
The Use of Signing Statements by the Bush II Administration Has 
Failed as a Policy Strategy. 
 
Having concluded that the use of signing statements by the Bush II 
administration does not violate judicial constitutional principles, and are more 
effectively viewed as a political exercise in constitutional construction, the 
question remains whether they are an appropriate or effective exercise of that 
power. 
1. The policy limits of political construction.  
Unlike judicial constitutional construction, in which disputes between the 
executive and legislative branches are refereed by the judiciary, which ultimately 
declares a ‘winner’ and a ‘loser,’ the outcome of political construction battles are 
not so decisive.  Political construction reflects a process more than an issue 
specific outcome, and the results are measured over time. Throughout this 
process, Whittington observes, “[t]he balance of powers [is] adjusted over time to 
match different political needs and different systems of political values.” 
57
  
Whittington sees the success or failure of a particular political construction policy 
as being determined by various mechanisms that impact the stability of that 
construction. He identifies one of these mechanisms as “ideological, or the 
articulation of a persuasive conception of constitutional meaning that is then 
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widely adopted among relevant political actors.” 
58
   Another mechanism for 
stabilizing political construction involves “the structuring of political support.”
 59
   
While this mechanism does not require widespread acceptance, it does require 
convincing “all parties [of the relevant coalition] that a commitment to the 
construction, or at least a lack of hostility to the construction, is necessary to their 
own political success.”
60
 
Using these mechanisms as guideposts, one can readily deduce the factors 
to be evaluated in determining the success or failure of a given political 
construction. First, the extent to which the construction at issue has actually been 
adopted must be considered. Second, irrespective of its immediate adoption, one 
must consider the acceptance (or rejection) of the construction as an ideological 
concept.  Finally, the political support generated behind the construction, as well 
as the political opposition generated, should be considered.  Measured against 
each of these yardsticks, the use of signing statements by the Bush II 
administration has not been successful. 
2. President Bush’s use of signing statements has not been adopted, nor have 
the political positions he has sought to advance through signing statements.  
 
The widespread use of signing statements by the Bush II administration is 
not a measure of success.  That is, of course, because they are entirely unilateral.  
They require neither agreement nor a decision not to oppose them, as neither 
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Congress nor the courts have a mechanism to challenge them at the time they are 
issued.   
On the other hand, the success of their underlying objectives is a fair 
proxy for the success of signing statements in general. One of the principle 
objectives advanced for signing statements was to increase the President’s 
influence over legislation, and better position him to push through his legislative 
agenda.  There is no evidence that this has in fact occurred.  The success of the 
signing statement can be judged partially on the success rate presidents have had 
pushing their agenda through Congress.  Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports 
has published the presidential success rate with Congress.  This information, 
while surely affected by other variables, suggests that signing statements did not 
successfully push the president’s agenda through Congress: 
 
 
 
 
Year - Success Rate   Year - Success Rate    Year - Success Rate     Year - Success Rate 
 
1981  -  2.4%           1989   -  62.6%             1993   -  86.4%        2001  -   86.7%           
1982  -  72.4%        1990    -  46.8%             1994   -  86.4%        2002  -   78.8% 
1983  -  67.1%        1991    -  54.2%             1995   -  36.3%        2003  -   78.7% 
1984  -  65.8%        1992    -  43.0%             1996   -  55.1%        2004  -   72.6% 
1985  -  59.9%                                               1997   -  53.6%       2005  -    78.0% 
1986  -  56.1%                                               1998   -  50.6% 
1987  -  43.5%                                               1999   -  37.8 % 
1988  -  47.4%                                               2000   -  55.0% 
 
 
Source: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, December 19,1992, p.3896; December 
21, 1996, p.3428; January 3, 1988, p. 13; January 9, 1999, p.86; December 14, 2002, 
p.3275; December 11, 2004; January 9, 2006. Qtd. in Pfiffner, James P. The Modern 
Presidency. 5th ed. United States: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005. 166. 
 
 
Reagan Bush I Clinton Bush II 
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This information shows that in each of the four administrations discussed, the 
president’s success rate with Congress dropped significantly from the first to the 
second term.  While George W. Bush’s success rate dropped the least of the four 
presidents, it still is on a downward trend.  Moreover, this information is 
unavailable after 2005, when democrats took control of Congress.  A swing in 
power to Democrats in Congress since 2005 suggests that Bush II’s success rate 
has most likely fallen significantly since 2005.   
  The evidence is even more compelling when it comes to specific aspects 
of Bush II’s legislative agenda.  For example, a principal target of his signing 
statements has been legislation relating to the war in Iraq.  In 2006, he issued a 
signing statement with respect to the so-called McCain Amendment to the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2006, which categorically prohibits cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment of any and all detainees by all U.S personnel, wherever 
they are located.  In language typical of his other signing statements, President 
Bush stated that in executing the statute he could interpret in “in a manner 
consistent with the constitutional authority of the president to supervise the 
unitary executive branch and as commander-in-chief and consistent with the 
constitutional limits on judicial power.” 
61
  He recently issued a similar statement 
in connection with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, reserving his 
right to ignore aspects of the legislation addressing his duty to faithfully execute 
the law: 
Today, I have signed into law H.R. 4986, the 
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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008. The Act authorizes funding for the defense of 
the United States and its interests abroad, for 
military construction, and for national security-
related energy programs. 
Provisions of the Act, including sections 841, 846, 
1079, and 1222, purport to impose requirements 
that could inhibit the President's ability to carry out 
his constitutional obligations to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed, to protect national 
security, to supervise the executive branch, and to 
execute his authority as Commander in Chief. The 
executive branch shall construe such provisions in a 
manner consistent with the constitutional authority 
of the President. 
George W. BushThe White House,January 28, 
2008.H.R. 4986, approved January 28, was 
assigned Public Law No. 110-181.
62
 
 
  Have these statements been effective in preserving presidential authority 
in these areas?  The evidence suggests the answer is “no.”  There are no concrete 
examples of the Bush II administration actually refusing to enforce clear 
legislative mandate, or to adopt an interpretation obviously contrary to that 
intended by Congress. Whether this is because situations have not arisen that 
would require the administration to take this position, or because the 
administration has not wanted to escalate confrontation around these issues, the 
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fact remains that the administration has simply not used the turf staked out by its 
signing statements.  Moreover, the administration’s position on these issues is 
generally unpopular, both politically and with the public in general.   
  Indeed, it can be fairly said that President Bush’s historically low approval 
ratings generally, and those with respect to his conduct of the Iraq war in 
particular, suggest a general failure with respect to his war policies. In this 
context, his attempt to expand and consolidate his presidential power with respect 
to virtually any issue touching upon the war cannot be viewed as a success. And 
while, under Whittington’s view, the ultimate proof must be measured over a 
longer period, it does not appear from the success—or lack thereof—of the 
initiatives of the Bush II administration that a foundation has been laid for 
expanded presidential powers going forward. 
 Another objective of signing statements was to give the president a place 
at the table when it comes to legislative interpretation.  This objective has been a 
complete failure.  Following the lead of a number of scholars who have argued 
that signing statements should be given “no weight” in interpreting legislation, the 
Roberts Court held that the contemporaneous views of the president are virtually 
irrelevant to the process of determining a statute’s meaning.
63
 
 Alasdair Roberts, Professor of Public Administration in the Maxwell 
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, has theorized 
that the United States is in a postmillennial liberal state that has weakened the 
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authority of the president.
64
  Due to this, the presidency cannot be as strong as it 
was in the mid-twentieth century.  Roberts claims that in response to the decline 
of presidential power in this period, Bush II has attempted to expand his power of 
command: 
The 9/11 attacks were regarded as an opportunity 
to revive presidential authority.  More than five 
years after the attacks, it should be possible to 
assess whether this goal has been achieved.  It is 
necessary, when doing this, to look beyond 
individual battles about presidential prerogative – 
the fight over presidential signing statements or 
over the breadth of executive privilege, for example 
– and consider instead the overall outcome of the 
struggle over executive power.
65
   
 
Roberts concludes that Bush II has done very little to affect the constraints on the 
presidency and to increase executive power – two main goals of signing 
statements.
66
  Because the signing statement failed to achieve these goals it can be 
rendered a failed policy.  Furthermore, the attempt to expand presidential 
authority contributed to the negative perception of the second Bush administration 
being an “imperial presidency.” 
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3.  The ideology underlying Bush II’s use of signing statements has not been 
widely accepted. 
 
The Bush II administration believes that it is appropriate to routinely issue 
signing statements questioning an enormous number of legislative provisions in 
order to expand presidential power. Putting aside the fact that this policy has not 
worked, the underlying ideology has not been widely accepted outside the 
administration.  Even those who espouse the use of signing statements generally 
have criticized the Bush II approach.  Perhaps the most stark example of this 
mindset is Walter Dellinger, one of the early architects of signing statement 
policy as head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel from 1993 to 
1996.  While Dellinger continues to defend the use of signing statements and the 
authority of the executive branch to refuse to enforce legislative provisions he 
believes to be unconstitutional, he cannot defend the Bush II approach to signing 
statements.  Indeed, Dellinger believes that this administration has relied upon a 
warped interpretation of his analysis in 1994 to justify its policy. Specifically, 
Dellinger emphasized that a president  
Should presume laws are valid and accord great 
deference to Congress’ views that its acts are 
consistent with the Constitution.  A president should 
also recognize that, while the Supreme Court is not 
the sole arbiter of constitutionality, it plays a 
special role in resolving such questions.” If 
conscientiously followed, these principles reduce 
the risk that a president will assert a dubious claim 
of unconstitutionality in order to sidestep a law he 
simply doesn’t like. The Bush [II] administration’s 
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frequent and seemingly cavalier refusal to enforce 
laws, which is aggravated by its avoidance of 
judicial review and eve public disclosure of its 
actions, places it at odds with these principles and 
with predecessors of both parties.
67
  
 
This abuse, Dellinger contends, reflects a deeper problem: the Bush II 
“administration’s extravagant claims to unilateral authority to govern.”
68
 
   Similarly, while Professor Laurence Tribe agrees that signing statements 
are largely “informative and constitutionally unobjectionable,” he concludes that 
this administration has abused the practice.
69
  He finds the practice “objectionable 
not by virtue of the signing statements themselves but rather by virtue of the 
president’s refusal to face the political music by issuing a veto and subjecting that 
veto to the possibility of an override by Congress.”
70
   
Rather than articulating a “persuasive conception of constitutional 
meaning” around signing statements, as Whittington suggests
71
, this 
administration has simply bulldozed ahead, alienating even those who are 
sympathetic to the use of signing statements. In the absence of broad-based 
ideological support, this policy is unlikely to have any long-term traction. 
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4.  Bush II’s use of signing statements has fostered mistrust and hostility in 
Congress. 
 
 Unsurprisingly, the Bush II administration’s use of signing statements to 
unilaterally expand presidential power has not been well received in Congress. 
The adverse reaction is not new. Indeed, following President Reagan’s use of a 
signing statement in connection with his execution of the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986, Barney Frank commented that the practice constituted 
“the gravest usurpation of legislative prerogative I can think of.” 
72
  While the 
rhetoric has remained harsh, the threat has grown in the eyes of Congress as it has 
evolved into a perceived frontal assault on the legislative function.  In a Senate 
Judiciary Committee hearing on ”Presidential Signing Statements” held on June 
27, 2006, Ranking Member Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) remarked: 
 
We are at a pivotal moment in our Nation’s history, 
where Americans are faced with a President who 
makes sweeping claims for almost unchecked 
Executive power. One of the most troubling aspects 
of such claims is the President’s unprecedented use 
of signing statements.  Historically, those 
statements have served as public announcements 
containing comments from the President. But this 
administration has taken what was otherwise a 
press release and transformed it into a 
proclamation stating which parts of the law the 
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President will follow and which parts he will simply 
ignore.
73
 
 
This view is by no means limited to Congressional Democrats. Indeed, 
Republican Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, has asserted that the legislative authority of Congress “doesn’t 
amount to anything if the president can say, ‘My constitutional authority 
supersedes the statute.’ And I think we’ve got to lay down the gauntlet and 
challenge him on it.”  And Senator Specter did.  On July 26, 2006, Senator 
Specter introduced a bill granting legislators legal standing to bring litigation 
challenging the legality of signing statements.
74
   In advancing this legislation, he 
stated: 
The President cannot use a signing statement to 
rewrite the words of a statute nor can the President 
use a signing statement to selectively nullify those 
provisions he does not like. This much is clear from 
the Constitution…If the President is permitted to 
rewrite the bills that Congress passes and cherry 
pick which provisions he likes and does not like, he 
subverts the constitutional process designed by our 
Framers.
75
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The proposed legislation reflected Congress’s anger at the power play that the 
Bush II administration’s use of signing statements represented.  It also reflected 
the frustration of not being able to confront them directly, because the Supreme 
Court had consistently ruled that legislators do not have legal standing to 
challenge such actions in court because they have not suffered the requisite 
“injury.”  Specifically, the Supreme Court has granted standing to legislators only 
in cases involving the nullification of a specific vote.
76
  Issuance of a signing 
statement questioning the constitutionality of a legislative provision or indicating 
the intent not to enforce a provision in the future does not rise to the level of vote 
nullification under these cases.   
 Congress’s extreme reaction has further fanned the flames of hostility 
between Congress and the Bush II administration.  Such hostility cannot, of 
course, be contained within the single issue of signing statements or the bills that 
they affect. Indeed, they have been used in so many statutes that this “limitation” 
would not be all that limiting.  
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CONCLUSION      VI 
  
  
 Recent debates over presidential signing statements have mistakenly 
focused solely on legal arguments concerning the constitutionality of this practice.  
This narrow focus overlooks the fact that signing statements have historically 
been used as a policy by the executive branch to advance the presidential agenda.  
It also forces analysis of them into a limited analytical model, based solely upon 
legal precedent, that does not fully capture the relevant issues. This traditional 
model suggests that signing statements are constitutional and therefore 
appropriate, despite the fact that broad criticism of signing statements persists. 
Analyzing signing statements not in terms of their constitutionality but as 
executive policy permits a deeper assessment of these concerns, and more far 
reaching conclusions with respect to their advisability.   
Equating constitutionality with good policy conflates two completely 
separate issues.  Analyzing the efficacy of signing statements as policy 
demonstrates that they are not good policy despite the fact that they are likely 
constitutional. Thus, they provide a concrete example of why these two analyses 
are distinct. The inverse is also true; that is, an effective policy might not pass 
constitutional muster. An example of this might be the line item veto. Passed by 
Congress and signed by President Clinton, many believed that the line item veto 
was effective policy that helped to streamline the legislative process and limited 
the opportunity for legislators to hold up important legislation by adding on 
partisan or pork barrel provisions.  However, the Supreme Court ruled in Clinton 
v City of New York that the line item veto unconstitutionally transferred to the 
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president a function allocated to Congress.
77
  This was so even though Congress 
approved the transfer. 
 Since the Reagan administration, signing statements have been used 
extensively and even after numerous variations of use, they have not served their 
intended purpose as a policy.  Using the concepts of presidential power set forth 
by Neustadt, Kernell and Howell (power of persuasion, going public and 
unilateral action), presidents for over two decades attempted to use signing 
statements to increase executive influence in the legislative process.  After failed 
attempts to create an effective policy by four administrations, it is apparent that 
signing statements are bad policy and cannot be made more effective.  In fact, the 
recent use of signing statements has been counterproductive.  They have 
generated a great deal of hostility between the executive and legislative branches, 
and widespread criticism by legal scholars and the general public.  
 The teaching of this paper reaches beyond its conclusions about 
presidential signing statements. It demonstrates the importance of utilizing an 
analytical framework that is broad enough to capture the salient issues and 
concerns raised by the issue presented. When it comes to turf battles between the 
branches of government—of which signing statements are an example—the 
traditional analysis has all too often been limited to legal assessments based upon 
separation of powers principles. Expanding the analysis to include policy issues 
broadens, deepens and strengthens the analysis and the resulting conclusions.  
 
                                                 
77 Clinton v. City of New York, no. 97-134, Supreme Ct. of the US, 27 April 1998. 
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 Beginning in 2006, Charlie Savage, a political columnist for The Boston 
Globe, began writing a series of articles on the use of signing statements by 
President George W. Bush.  Since then, presidential signing statements have been 
the subject of much debate. My original goal at the outset of this project was to 
examine the constitutionality of presidential signing statements within the context 
of separation of powers principles. However, it became evident that many of the 
legal arguments for and against the use of signing statements have been exhausted 
without a clear resolution.  Ultimately, I found the arguments that they were 
unconstitutional unconvincing, and yet was still troubled by how they were being 
used. 
At this point, my lack of legal expertise became advantageous as I started 
examining the signing statement as a policy instead of exclusively as a legal issue.  
What I came to realize is that many of the legal arguments being made were based 
on issues of policy rather than legality.  By assessing signing statements within an 
analytical framework based upon policy rather than constitutionality, the issue of 
signing statements became a canvas on which to examine the correlation between 
policy arguments and constitutional examination in conventional policy analysis.  
 To illustrate the premise of this argument, the four-cell table below 
represents the full spectrum of analysis that can be utilized in assessing behavior 
by one branch that potentially intrudes upon the domain of another. Using signing 
statements as an example, this paper argues that conventional analysis based upon 
legal/constitutional principles underutilizes the full range of available analysis and 
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confines the arguments to an unduly narrow perspective.  With reference to this 
table, traditional analysis is limited to cells 1 and 4 of the table, essentailly 
equating constitutionality with good policy, and vice versa. 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY-POLICY MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
Constitutional Unconstitutional 
Good 
Policy 1 2 
Bad 
Policy 3 4 
 
Utilizing the entire table above suggests a policy can be both good and 
unconstitutional, or bad policy can be constitutional. A policy must be judged on 
effectiveness, feasibility and a cost-benefit analysis to see if it will successfully 
fulfill its intended purpose.  Constitutionality is determined to establish whether 
or not a policy can be implemented without violating legal principles. By 
separating constitutional arguments from policy analysis, it becomes easier to 
effectively and unabashedly evaluate a policy. 
 The methods used to perform this study were two-fold.  First, the legal 
arguments both for and against the use of signing statements were briefly 
identified, and it was concluded that signing statements are not a violation of the 
Constitution, at least at the time they are made.  This conclusion provided the 
foundation for making the larger connection between constitutionality and policy.  
There are solid legal arguments on both sides of this issue, but there is yet to be 
POLICY 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
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any empirical evidence that signing statements have caused harm to the public by 
violating the Constitution.  The primary sources used in the first section of the 
paper were from law reviews, scholarly studies on signing statements, reports on 
the use of signing statements and original White House documents regarding the 
implementation of signing statements.  
Second, the use of signing statements was examined from the Reagan 
administration to the George W. Bush administration.  Using three theories of 
presidential exertion of power – the power of persuasion, going public and 
unilateral action – signing statements were identified as an executive policy used 
to advance the president’s agenda in Congress and to have presidential 
interpretation become a part of legislative history. 
 The two-dimensional analysis of this paper concludes that signing 
statements are constitutional, but are a bad policy.  Particularly as utilized by 
George W. Bush, signing statements have not been effective in either expanding 
presidential policy generally, or specifically his political or legislative agenda.  
Not only did the implementation of the signing statement not achieve its attended 
goals, it created controversy over the exertion of presidential authority in the 
second Bush administration.  And while this policy was not expensive to 
implement, it was costly by creating negative publicity for the Bush 
administration (e.g. the Charlie Savage articles).  In the end, the costs of 
implementing this policy far outweigh the benefits.  One of the advantages of 
examining policy using the constitutionality- policy model is that a good policy 
that violates the Constitution can sometimes be altered to be legally implemented 
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and vice versa for a bad policy.  In the case of signing statements, their use as an 
exertion of presidential influence on legislation have been exhausted and they 
cannot be modified into a good policy. 
 This paper provides important insights into how policy is examined when 
the issue of constitutionality is involved.  The more thorough analysis provided in 
the constitutionality-policy model helped frame the recent debate over 
presidential signing statements as a policy issue rather than one of 
constitutionality and from that perspective concluded that signing statements are  
bad policy regardless of constitutionality.  The broader significance of this paper 
is the expansive use of policy analysis that separates the traditional coupling of 
constitutionality with policy analysis.  This model can be used to reexamine old 
policies and new policy proposals.  The expectation is that this new analysis will 
allow for the modification of policies before they are disregarded because they are 
deemed unconstitutional and so that bad policies are not implemented purely on 
the basis of their constitutionality. 
 
